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COMMENTS
PITFALLS IN THE STANDARD OFFER
TO PURCHASE FORM
Reflection will reveal that the right of a client at the closing of
title, and many of his post-closing rights, are entirely dependent
upon the provision of the contract. It is uniformly observed how-
ever by the thoughtful practitioner that there is a tendency to
minimize or overlook the importance to be attached to the func-
tion of the contract in the transaction. The outcome of litigation
between the vendor and purchaser will depend principally upon
the terms of the contract."
This tendency to minimize the importance of the interim contract
in the purchase of realty is evidenced by the fact that for years non-
legal personnel have prepared such documents as a matter of practice.
This in turn gives rise to the implication that the legal rights of the
public are not seriously affected by such practice.
Recently, the issue came to a head in Wisconsin, resulting in the
now widely known case of State ex rel Reynolds v. Dinger.2 By a 4 to
3 decision our supreme court held that although the filling out of certain
standard forms constituted the practice of law, brokers might continue
the practice as limited by R.E.B. 5.04, which rule prescribes certain
standard forms that real estate brokers may use in carrying out their
business.3 However, it should be emphasized that it was the action of
the court and not the Real Estate Brokers Board which relaxed the
prohibition against the practice of law by such laymen and that the right
to withdraw the permission was expressly reserved. 4
It is not the intention of this paper to add to the voluminious legal
writings presently available arguing for or against the practice of lay-
men drafting various legal documents. Since for the present the issue
has been settled in Wisconsin, "It is obviously incumbant upon lawyers
to accept the supreme court's decision with as much grace as possible."2'
Rather it is the purpose of this article to re-examine the offer to pur-
chase form commonly used in Wisconsin and thereby attempt to point
1 BRICKS, CONTRACTS OF THE SALE OF REALTY, p. 11 (1946).
2 State ex tel Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W. 2d 685 (1962).
3 Wis. Aim. CODE §REB 5.04.
4 "We conclude that Rule, §REB 5.04, includes provisions which permit to a
limited extent the practice of the law by certain nonlawyers; that the regula-
tion of the practice of the law is a judicial power and is vested exclusively in
the Supreme Court; that the practitioner in or out of court, licensed lawyer
or layman, is subject to such regulation; that whenever the court's view of
the public interest requires it, the court has the power to make appropriate
regulations concerning the practice of law in the interest of the administra-
tion of justice, and to modify or declare void any such rule, law, or regula-
tion by whomever promulgated, which appears to the court to interfere with
the court's control of such practice for such ends." State ex rel Reynolds v.
Dinger, supra note 2, at 206.
5 Lorincizi, The Realtors Case-An Evaluation in Retrospect, 22 MILxVAUKEE
BAR AssN. GAvEL §2, p. 17, August, 1961.
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out certain potential legal pitfalls which will be encountered if the
draftsman relies blindly on the so called "standard forms." Because of
the broad scope of the undertaking some areas of difficulty have been
ignored or given only cursory treatment. Further this examination is
limited exclusively to the conveyance of residential property. Never-
theless, if the article does succeed in raising certain questions in the
mind of the draftsman and encourages him to seek an answer, then
its purpose will have been fulfilled. There is case law in other juris-
dictions imposing civil liability on laymen for the negligent preparation
of documents 6 and State er rel State Bar of Wisconsin v. Keller 7 em-
phatically warns brokers that they should be careful in filling out such
forms. It is hoped that the following observations will aid all such
draftsmen in conforming their conduct to the high standards which the
Bar and the public have the right to expect.
This article is concerned exclusively with Form No. WB 1, which
has been approved by the Wisconsin Real Estate Broker's Board.
PARTIES, THEIR IDENTIFICATIONS AND RELATIONS
In a contract for the sale of land, there must be an identification
of the thing sold, an agreement as to the price to be paid, and the
consent of the parties.8 It is necessary for the validity of a written
contract that the contracting parties be described. In Kohlbrecker v.
Guetterinann9 it was held that a written contract was insufficient to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds where the written memorandum of the
contract failed to make reference to the names of the parties. Our
statute of frauds regulating a contract for the sale of realty is §240.08.10
It provides:
Every contract of leasing for a longer period than one year or for
the sale of any lands or any interest in lands shall be void un-
less the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, express-
ing the consideration, be in writing and subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is made, or his lawfully authorized
agent.
Harney v. Burhans,1 1 an early Wisconsin case, held that a memorandum
is sufficient to satisfy the statute, if it is definite in respect to the inten-
tion of the parties, their identity, their relation to each other, the
property, the price and the terms of payment. In that case the plaintiff
orally agreed to purchase defendant's land. Plaintiff paid $2,200 down
6 Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 A. 63 (1934) ; Weintz v. Kramer, 44
La.Ann. 35, 10 So. 416 (1892) ; Brakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.
2d 16 (1957).
7 State ex rel State Bar of Wisconsin v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W. 2d
796 (1962).
8 Sturdivant v. Walker, 202 Ga. 585, 43 S.E. 2d 527 (1947).
9 Kohlbrecker v. Guettermann, 329 Ill. 246, 160 N.E. 142 (1928).
10 VWis. STAT. §240.08 (1961).
11 Harney v. Burhans, 91 Wis. 348, 64 N.W. 1031 (1895).
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and defendant gave him a receipt which said "received of Brennan..."
and which was signed by the defendant. Brennan, Harney's agent in
the purchase of the land, received oral authorization (which is not for-
bidden under 240.08). But the purchaser, Harney, was not identified
in the receipt, and the court held that the memorandum failed to meet
the statutory requirements of stating who the parties were and their
relationship to each other.
Therefore in approaching the problem of naming the parties and
their relationship, the draftsman is seeking to identify the parties who
are binding themselves to the purchase agreement. From the memor-
andum one must be able to see who is selling and who is buying. But
there is a difference between naming and identifying a party. The pur-
chaser may not want his identity disclosed (e.g., a corporation buying
land would be forced to pay more if people knew they needed the
land). So an agent may contract in his own name though using another's
money and thus be an agent for a totally undisclosed principal. Or the
contract might say "Smith as agent" is the purchaser but fail to disclose
the principal. This would constitute a partially disclosed agency-i.e.
it is known that there is a principal, but the memorandum doesn't
identify him. What will be the effect of an undisclosed principal or
partially disclosed principal signing the contract as regards the satisfac-
tion of the requirements of §240.08 regarding the identity of the par-
ties? The rule from Harney v. Burhans is where the contract in fact
involves a totally undisclosed principal but where the memorandum
fails to even partially disclose the fact of agency, such a memorandum
fails to meet the requirements of §240.08 and the contract is void.
In Padol v. Switalsk12 the Wisconsin court held that an extrinsic
writing could supply the name of the purchaser. In that case the
defendant gave the broker the exclusive right to sell his property. The
broker in turn gave plaintiff an option to purchase, subject to the
owner's approval. In the option agreement the broker named the pur-
chaser. Defendant later executed a separate agreement with the broker
approving the terms of the option. The question presented to the court
was whether the two writings satisfied §240.08 even though the defend-
ant's written approval of the option made no mention of who the pur-
chaser was.
The principle of the Padol case was refined by Kelly v. Sullivan
13
where it was held that the mere fact that another memorandum con-
tains the missing element will not itself suffice to satisfy the requirement
of §240.08. Rather, in addition there must be satisfactory evidence that
both parties were aware of the unsigned extrinsic document and as-
sented to the fact that its content constituted part of their contract. The
12 Padol v. Switalski, 248 Wis. 183, 21 N.W. 2d 375 (1945).
'3 Kelly v. Sullivan, 252 Wis. 52, 30 N.VA. 2d 209 (1947).
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draftsman should see to it that the interim sales contract is explicit to
the identity of the parties and their relationship. It would be foolhardy
to gamble that a court will later supply the essential element from an-
other document and thus save the contract.
But will the rule from Harney v. Burhans apply so as to void the
contract where the party signing the memorandum indicates that he is
an agent but fails to disclose the principal? Can you look outside the
four corners of the memorandum to define agent? Under general
agency principles such partial disclosure will bind the principal. 14 Fur-
thermore there is the general rule that whenever the memorandum is
indefinite, ambiguous or uncertain to any details, parol evidence may be
admitted to ascertain which alternative the parties intended. 15 In both
the Kelly and the Padol cases two writings were used to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds and only one was signed by the seller or his agent.
In such a situation if the advocate is denied the right to step outside
the four corners of the writing neither oral testimony nor the principle
of using extrinsic document, enunciated in the Kelly and the Padol cases
could be used to argue for the validity of the contract. So it would
appear that where a memorandum describes the purchaser or seller
as agent without disclosing the principal (and an agency does in fact
exist) there would seem to be an ambiguity which would in that situa-
tion justify the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of
the parties. But if the instrument says nothing about any agency and
there is in fact an undisclosed agency then under the Harney rule the
contract is void for failure to identify the principal. Thus the principal
could not be held liable on the contract.
From all of this it becomes evident that there can be serious rami-
fications from the failure to properly designate the parties to the con-
tract. If the draftsman starts off wrong at this point he may as well go
no further, since if the contract is then void any further drafting will
only prove to be a useless exercise.
A further aspect of the problem of proper parties is that involving
interspousal relationships. Must the wife join with her husband in such
a contract in all cases? If not, when must she? In the case of the
purchaser there seems to be no compelling reason why a wife should
join her husband in executing the contract. In most cases it is doubtful
that the purchaser would like to see his wife obligated by the contract
should he die after its execution but before closing. The argument to
have the wife join in the offer is mainly advanced by the brokers. They
maintain that if the offer is contingent upon the buyer securing a mort-
14 RESTATEMENT, AGENcy 2d, §144: A disclosed or partially disclosed principal
is subject to liability upon contracts made by an agent acting within his
authority if made in proper form and with the understanding that the princi-
pal is a party.
35 SIMPSON, CONTRACrS §66, at 239 (1954).
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gage, the wife who is not a party to the offer may refuse to sign the
mortgage if financing is needed. They further contend that lenders in-
variably insist that both husband and wife sign the mortgage. The end
result which they fear is that the wife may prove to be stubborn and
thus effectively kill the sale. An additional fear is that should the hus-
band decide to back out, all he need do is have his wife refuse to sign
the mortgage and turn all his property over to her, thus making him
judgment proof. An answer to this is that there is no real reason why a
lending institution should insist on both signatures when a purchase
money mortgage is involved. 16 And it may be somewhat presumptuous
to say that all or most lenders presently would require both signatures
in such a situation before they would lend the money on a purchase
money mortgage. This is definitely one area where a potential purchaser
having legal counsel would likely refuse to have his wife become a
party to the interim contract. But the broker is likely to insist on both
parties signing the contract. Here is but one of many instances where
the lay draftsman is faced with a serious conflict of interest. He cannot
give legal advice and yet the parties deserve to know the possible legal
effects of the contract into which they are entering.
Regarding the seller, there are times when it is imperative that both
husband and wife join the contract to convey. Sections 235.01(2) and
(3)17 are relevant in this regard.
235.01 Conveyance, how made, homestead
(2) No mortgage or other alienation by a married man of his
homestead, exempt by law from execution, or any interest
therein, legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or
otherwise shall be valid without his wife's consent, evidenced
by her act of joining in the same deed, mortgage, or other
conveyance, except a conveyance from husband to wife.
(3) No mortgage or other alienation by a married woman of any
interest legal or equitable, present or future, by deed or
otherwise, in a homestead held by her and her husband as
joint tenants, shall be valid without her husband's consent,
evidenced by his act of joining in the same conveyance or
mortgage or executing a separate conveyance or mortgage
of the same nature as the wife's except a conveyance from
wife to husband.
Thus any attempted alienation of the homestead is void if made by the
husband alone and in these cases the wife must sign as a party to the
contract if it is not to be held void. So the question will arise as to what
16 Wis. STAT. §233.05 (1961). Where a husband purchases land during coverture
and as a part of the transaction of purchase executes a purchase money mort-
gage thereon or a portion thereof to secure the payment of all or a part of
the purchase money, his widow shall not be entitled to dower out of such
mortgaged land as against the mortgagee . . . although she did not unite
in such mortgage,...
17 WIs. STAT. §235.01 (1961).
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constitutes a homestead. Our statutes speak of an exempt homestead
and state that it is limited to an interest not exceeding $10,000.00.11
§990.01(13) says:
The word "Homestead" means the dwelling and so much of the
land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for use of the
dwelling as a home, but not less than Y acre (if available) and
not exceeding 40 acres. 19
Homestead is domicil and it is usually easy to ascertain where the par-
ties are domiciled and thus determine whether homestead property is
involved in the sale. But if a person has left his homestead for a special
reason and the time of absence is indefinite in duration (e.g. hospitaliza-
tion, a change between summer and winter domicil, etc.) the problem
may be more difficult for the draftsman. The general principle is that
the domicil in which the greater portion of the year is spent prevails
as the homestead. This homestead may .change from time to time by
actual physical movement and intent. But the fact remains that an at-
tempt to alienate a homestead by the husband, or by the wife where the
property is jointly owned, will be void. A possible exception to this
strict statutory rule is that broad principles of estoppel may be applied
if the wife partakes in the alienation and actively or passively gives
her approval.20 The draftsman should be particularly careful to ascer-
tain whether homestead property is involved for it then becomes
imperative that both husband and wife join in the contract to convey.
In addition to the problems of homestead the draftsman must be
aware of the fact that the surviving wife enjoys dower in all the lands
in which her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance during
their marriage.2 ' The wife's dower interest is an inchoate right and thus
it becomes a factor only where she survives her husband. If the wife
in such a situation does not sign the interim land contract she will not
be bound to sign the deed at the closing. Thus she would retain her in-
choate right of dower. From the purchaser's point of view, he will
insist that the offer be directed to both the husband and wife and signed
by both of them. Should the offer only be accepted and signed by the
husband there would nevertheless be a valid contract. The purchaser
could not demand that the wife sign the deed. But he may be able to
hold back from the purchase price an amount equal to the value of the
wife's potential dower interest.2 2 But how does one arrive at a value of
is Wis. STAT. §272.20 (1961).
19 Wis. STAT. §990.01 (1961).
20 McBride v. Seney, 192 Ill. App. 18 (1915) ; Bailey v. Goldberg, 236 Mich. 29,
209 N.W. 805 (1926). The wife could orally authorize her husband to convey
away the homestead since 240.08 doesn't require written authorization. He
then could in writing authorize the real estate agent by signing for himself
and his wife.
21 WIS. STAT. §233.01 (1961).
22 O'Malley v. Miller, 148 Wis. 393, 134 N.W. 840 (1912).
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an inchoate right since it is a right which will be of value only if she
survives her husband? Some courts have considered the practical diffi-
culty of measuring the value of this interest as no greater than in other
instances where damages are not capable of exact computation.23 Never-
theless it creates a very difficult problem. To fix an abatement, the
present value of an inchoate right of dower must be determined and
this invariably can be nothing but pure conjecture. This is true because
the right may never vest. As a practical matter then, the purchaser may
find that the right to abatement is nothing but a hollow right. Being
faced with such a situation the purchaser would have but two alterna-
tives-either accept the deed and hope that the wife's inchoate right
never vests or refuse to accept the deed with such a cloud on it. Of
course he could probably also sue for breach of contract but the expense
involved may well outweigh any damages awarded or recovered.
DEsCRIPTION
What is a sufficient description of the land and building involved
in the interim contract so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds? The form
is set up in the following manner.
... hereby offers to purchase the property known as
in the of
,Wisconsin, more particularly described as:
having a frontage of about - feet, with a depth of about
feet, at the price and on the terms and conditions as fol-
lows:
The description of the property to be conveyed is likewise regulated by
§240.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The basic question presented in this
area is when has the draftsman succeeded in describing the property so
as to satisfy the statute? From the cases we find that the test evolves on
whether the contract permits the court to ascertain to a reasonable cer-
tainty what was intended without resort to certain kinds of extrinsic
evidence. This statement therefore infers that in a contested case some
type of extrinsic evidence will be allowed. The point of distinction, be-
tween those cases holding that the contract satisfies the Statute of
Frauds and those where it fails, is the kind of evidence which is offered
to clarify the memorandum's uncertainties.
In Graham v. Lamp24 the defendant signed, through an authorized
agent, a listing contract with the plaintiff who was a broker. The con-
tract began by stating the defendant's name and address. The descrip-
tion in the body of the contract read "2 cottages on this lot 49x126 feet.
23 Williams v. Vessels, 94 Kan. 71, 145 Pac. 856 (1915).
24 Graham v. Lamp, 174 Wis. 373, 183 N.W. 150 (1921).
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5 room front cottage; 5 room rear cottage." On the back of the contract
the following appeared, "location, 1211 20th Street, size of lot 49x126."
By statute all contracts to pay a commission for the sale of realty must
be in writing, and among other things, describe the real estate to be
sold. The question presented here was whether the description was suffi-
cient. The court felt it was because the description together with the
words "this lot" and the parol evidence described the land with sufficient
certainty. So here we see the court allowing the use of parol evidence
to determine what was to be conveyed. But then is there any limitation
on the type or scope of such parol evidence?
In Spence v. Frant,25 defendant contracted with plaintiff to convey
"the following described land contained in Stone's subdivision in sec-
tions nine and ten in the town of Greenfield, consisting of 110 acres,
more or less, said acreage to be determined by survey." The survey
showed there were 110 Y4 acres, 52 of which were subject to an ease-
ment for a public highway. Again the court had to decide whether the
description was sufficient and again it decided in the affirmative. The
court felt that, although a description of the property is an essential
term, parol evidence may be admitted to identify the land IF there is
some language in the writing to which parol evidence could be linked
and the property identified with reasonable certainty. Since the vendors
owned no other land which could answer this description, it was suffi-
cient.
In Thiel v. Johns26 the defendant owned a house in Little Chicago
located on 1Y2 acres of land. The house was enclosed by a fence which
did not encompass the full 1Y2 acres. Defendant agreed to sell and the
following memorandum was given in the form of a receipt. "Received
of Ernest Thiel, fifty and no/100 dollars. For down payment on house
at Little Chicago... $50.00. (Signed) William A. Johns. Bal. $2,450."
In this instance the court felt that the contract did not sufficiently de-
scribe the property. The court pointed out that parol evidence can only
be used where some language was expressed in the writing to which
parol evidence could be linked and the property identified with reason-
able certainty. To allow testimony as to what the parties orally agreed
to would be giving an independent effect to the parol understanding as
to the land involved. The difficulty here was that in describing the
property as "a house" the parties could have meant the house and 1Y2
acres or the house and the land inclosed by the fence or even less. To
have allowed parol evidence the court would have been permitting it to
establish which property was intended to be sold and not merely identify
the property in the memorandum. Thus we see the line of distinction
appears to be a fine, but very real one.
25 Spence v. Frantz, 195 Wis. 69, 217 N.W. 700 (1928).
26 Thiel v. Jahns, 252 Wis. 27, 30 N.W. 2d 189 (1947).
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As was pointed out earlier, the distinguishing point in all these cases
is in the type of evidence offered to clarify the ambiguity in the mem-
orandum. You can resort to other writings mentioned in the memoran-
dum or rely on outside physical facts such as ownership as shown by
the records in the Register of Deed's office. But purely testimonial evi-
dence (the property we agreed upon; the property we looked at) is dia-
metrically opposed to the Statute of Frauds and the purpose for which
this statute exists-that of stopping perjury. It makes no difference in
fact that the testimonial evidence is convincing. Extrinsic evidence will
only be allowed where it can be linked to some language in the written
memorandum which will leave the trier of fact reasonably sure which
property was intended.
Even in the use of physical facts certain criteria must be met. The
physical fact would have to be referred to in the memorandum in some
manner-e.g. "my lot." Thus staking the land out would be insufficient
unless some reference in the written contract was made such as "the
stakes which the parties placed." Then a court could view the land and
probably ascertain what the parties intended. Secondly, the physical fact
must itself be sufficiently free from ambiguity or tampering by one of
the parties so that the trier of fact can be reasonably certain he has the
right land as seen from the physical facts. A prime example where the
physical evidence was too ambiguous was in Durkin v. Machesky38 The
contract referred to "Southwest corner 28th and Meinecke, . . ." The
seller's wife owned two lots at that location. The court held that lacking
a designation "my lot" or "my wife's lot" the writing was insufficient.
From the foregoing it can be seen that proper description of proper-
ty in a contract, which must conform to the Statute of Frauds, has
caused draftsmen problems in the past and will probably continue to do
so. If the draftsman has available a correct legal description of the
property this may well serve as the best description. If it is not known,
and it usually isn't at this stage of the transaction, it will be the drafts-
man's job to provide as much detail as possible regarding the description
of the property to be conveyed. As we have seen, the contract cannot
be changed by evidence outside the memorandum, and if it isn't suffi-
cient the contract will be void for failure to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds. If there is a recorded plat describing the property it should be
used. In the case of city property the street address will suffice in most
cases. But providing further details as to what is located on the property
and its nature will constitute the better practice and thereby insure that
a court will be able to determine what was intended should litigation
ever arise. The key purpose of the draftsman in this area is to describe
the property intended by the parties in such a manner as will enable a
27 Supra note 24.
28 Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis. 595, 188 N.W. 97 (1922).
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trier of fact, in any subsequent litigation, to ascertain to a reasonable
certainty what was intended, without reliance on purely testimonial evi-
dence. This should be foremost in the draftsman's mind and he should
carefully consider whether the words he has used meet this crucial test.
One further point is that the draftsman might do well to ignore
filling in the blanks having to do with frontage and depth. The problem
that can arise here is that the figures may be in error and then it may
subsequently be held that the purchaser was conditioning his offer on
the property being in fact that size3 9 Should the dimensions then be
actually and significantly different the buyer may be able to avoid the
contract, or possibly bring an action for misrepresentation.
TERMS OF PAYMENT
Here again we are concerned with satisfying the requirements of
§240.08 in properly expressing the price and the terms of payment. In
MVlerten v. Koester,3 0 the plaintiff and the defendant agreed on the sale
of real estate whereby the plaintiff was to receive an apartment and
store building in exchange for his assuming the $28,000.00 mortgage
and paying an additional $7,500.00 cash and transferring a bungalow
to the defendant. The memorandum stated, "Pay to the order of Fred
Koester $1,000.00. part payment on the property at 1358-54 27th Street.
Balance $6,500.00 and bungalow, (Signed) Peter J. Merten." The court
held the memorandum was insufficient to satisfy §240.08 since it failed
to express the consideration. It completely omitted any mention of as-
suming the mortgage and the bungalow was not sufficiently described.
In Carlock v. Johnson,31 the plaintiff agreed to purchase certain property
from the defendant. The signed memorandum stated that the vendor
agreed that in conveying title he would stipulate in the mortgage, which
he held on the premises, for the release of any given lot or lots upon
payment to the seller of such a sum as might be thereafter agreed upon
as being equitable. The parties later discussed what amount would be
equitable, but being unable to agree, the plaintiff sought his money back.
The court felt that the agreement as to the amount to be paid for the
releases was a condition precedent to the completion of the contract
and to its validity under the statute of frauds since this was a material
element of the contract. Therefore since the parties didn't agree on the
matter, plaintiff was entited to regain his earnest money, for there was
no contract.
The cases indicate that if the contract contemplates any extension
of credit by the vendor himself the terms must be stated in the contract
29 Kuper v. Scruggins, 127 Colo. 416, 257 P. 2d 412 (1953) ; Hartsman v. Mueller,
195 Wis. 485, 218 N.W. 854 (1928).
30 Merten v. Koester, 199 Wis. 79, 225 N.W. 750 (1929).
31 Carlock v. Johnson, 165 Wis. 49, 160 N.W. 1053 (1917).
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to satisfy the statute of frauds. This principle would need only apply
to vendor financing and not to third party financing. There is a distinct
difference between the vendor undertaking to finance such a purchase
and a condition whereby the parties will not be bound unless finances
can be obtained from a third party lender. In vendor financing it is not
merely a condition but a material term of the contract since it is con-
cerned with the undertaking of both parties to the contract, whereas
third-party financing is related only to the buyer's undertaking to pay
the price and not the seller's undertaking to accept it as full payment.
In Kovarik v. Vesely32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave indirect cre-
dence to this distinguishing point. There the contract provided that the
terms of the mortgage financing were left to the discretion of the buyers
under a typical "subject to financing" provision. The court in effect con-
verted a contract which contemplated third-party financing into a ven-
dor financing contract. Then after doing so, they hypothecated that
the statute of frauds would be satisfied only if the terms were in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged. They supplied these terms by
incorporating a loan application of the purchasers into the contract.
Regardless of the fact that this case is questionable on a number of
points, 33 it does seem to stand for the proposition that the terms of
vendor financing are material to the contract and must either be stated
in the written memorandum or in another document which may be
incorporated. Since it seems to be an essential term, the draftsman
should be certain to spell out the details of the financing envisioned by
the parties when vendor or installment financing is involved. If he
fails in this respect the contract may well be held void for indefiniteness
as to a material element.
The draftsman's problems are not automatically solved where third-
party financing is contemplated by the contract. An argument might be
made that even here the terms of the financing are a material element
and therefore they must be stated with some degree of definiteness
since such qualifies the purchaser's basic undertaking to buy. The
counter argument is that the parties simply did not include any mutual
agreement respecting the details of financing. Further, such details are
not necessary since the terms of such financing are not matters of con-
tract between the buyer 9nd seller.
Probably the largest single problem in drafting such an interim
contract is that of adequately handling the difficulties involved in pre-
paring a satisfactory subject-to-financing clause where third party fi-
nancing is envisioned, (satisfactory in the sense that its meaning will be
clear to a court in the event of litigation). More important it must
32 Kovarik v. Vesely, 3 Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W. 2d 279 (1957).
33 See: Aiken, Subject to Financing Clauses in Interim Contract For The Sale
of Realty, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 265 (1960).
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clearly represent the intent of the parties, so that misunderstanding
and litigation itself will be avoided. Since most offers to purchase today
are contingent on financing, thoughtful consideration should be given
to the preparation of this clause. In this area no problem will arise if
the sale is duly consummated. But it is when no financing can be ob-
tained by the buyer and he in turn desires his money back, that the
possibility of misunderstanding and litigation become a reality. Where
the terms are clearly defined, this possibility or difficulty will be greatly
eased.
Any doubt which may have existed previously as to whether terms
of the condition precedent (getting the financing) have to be mentioned
in the contract was partially settled with the case of Gerruth Realty Co.
v. Pire.94 The only problem with Gerruth is that the case was not de-
cided on the basis of the statute of frauds. Therefore it is still not
known for certain whether the terms of third party financing must be
stated in the written memorandum. The contingency clause used in that
contract read "This offer to purchase is further contingent upon the
purchaser obtaining the proper amount of financing. '35 Being unsuc-
cessful in securing financing and refusing that offered by the seller,
litigation was precipitated. The court was troubled by the vagueness,
which would allow sellers to claim that the availability of any amount
of financing or any rate of interest would satisfy the condition. Likewise
the court felt that any interpretation of a contract which allowed any
one party to the contract to determine without limitation and in a sub-
jective manner the meaning of an ambiguous term, came dangerously
close to an illusory or aleatory contract. 36 The conclusion of the court
was that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable inference
could be drawn as to what the parties contracted for. Further, it decided
to look to the element of good faith by the purchaser in such cases only
where the meaning of the ambiguous financing clause has been deter-
mined. Thus, in this case even if the purchaser had made no attempt to
secure financing and had been totally in bad faith he nevertheless would
have gotten out of his contract. Where the contract cannot be inter-
preted on the evidence, it will be held void for indefiniteness in the
opinion of Wisconsin's supreme court. A fair conclusion then would
be that a seller cannot simply rely on the courts to enforce the contract
where there is a failure of good faith on the part of the buyer. Based
on the Gerruth case, they won't enforce a contract which is vague and
indefinite. If a contingency is stated in the contract, the draftsman had
better specify, at least broadly, what that contingency is. The question
then arises as to how far he must go in this specification. It would
34 Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire, 17 Wis. 2d 89, 115 N.W. 2d 571 (1962).
3 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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seem to be the better procedure to include at least all of the following
details in any subject-to-financing clause:
1. Minimum amount of money which the borrower needs to
complete the contract.
2. Rate of interest the buyer will pay,
3. Repayment terms-maximum amortized monthly mortgage
payment including principal, interest, insurance and taxes for
a minimum term of how many years.
4. Loan procurement charges.
5. Fact of government guarantee if FHA or VA insurance is
involved.
6. A special security provision such as mortgage insurance if it is
involved and the amount which the buyer will pay for it.
7. Who is to arrange for the loan and procure it-the seller or
the buyer.
The court, in the Gerruth case, concerned itself only with the neces-
sity of stating the amount of the third party loan. Thus it may be argued
that all these other details enumerated above are really unnecessary.
But it should be remembered that all specifications involved in financing
the purchase of realty are in fact interdependent. Remember, we were
told in Gerruth that the question of good faith by the purchaser will
only be examined where the meaning of an ambiguous subject-to-financ-
ing clause has been determined. Will a mere statement of the amount
of the mortgage to be sought prevent the contract from being declared
void for indefiniteness? Better practice dictates that one should draft
the offer to prevent such a question from arising in the first place.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has made it clear that henceforth,
ambiguity of terms of an interim land contract will invalidate it. It may
well be that under present law only a total absence of specification of
detail in a subject to financing clause will render it void for indefinite-
ness. Yet it would appear that the prudent course to follow is to spell
out at least each of the above mentioned criteria of the acceptability of
financing.
In this connection the careful selection of proper language is ex-
tremely important. The draftsman should take every precaution to spell
out exactly what the parties intend in a clear and concise manner.
Ambiguity will only lead to court-made contracts in many instances. The
following is an example of such an ambiguous clause, often appearing
in such a contract.
"subject to securing a mortgage for $20,000.00 for 25 years...."
This would be unacceptable to the careful draftsman. Literally it sug-
gests a straight note, not an installment note as is most often contem-
plated by the parties to a real estate sales contract. Therefore, the pro-
per approach would be to simply and concisely specify that repayment
shall be by "amortized monthly mortgage payments. ... "
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As a practical matter, providing a time for securing the needed
financing, which is different from that time set for the closing, is cer-
tainly worth consideration. Basically, it is unrealistic to say that a pur-
chaser may continue in his attempt to secure financing right up to the
appointed time for closing or that he should be required to do so in
order to remain in good faith. Even if such a purchaser would be suc-
cessful one week before the time set for closing, he would never be in
a position to close on the appointed day. Thus, if time has been stated
to be of the essence in the contract, another area of litigation has been
created. A party selling real estate has placed it on the market to sell
and usually becomes quite impatient while waiting under a cloud of
uncertainty as to whether the property will be sold. Further, why should
he be required to hold his property off the market until the appointed
time for closing has passed, when it is obvious some weeks before, that
the purchaser will not be able to close on the appointed day? Likewise,
the buyer will probably prefer to have a limited, but sufficient time to
secure the necessary financing without running the risk of being held in
bad faith if he ceases his efforts before the time for closing has passed.
3 7
It should be pointed out that the financing condition is not the only
one which might appear in an interim contract for the purchase of realty.
But such a condition is by far the most common. Regardless of the
nature of the condition, the draftsman would do well to spell out the
details of any such condition precedent, so as to protect against a court
later finding that no contract existed because the terms were too indefi-
nite. When any condition is in fact stipulated as part of a contract for
the sale of realty, that condition should be at least broadly specified.
The court has indicated in the Gerruth case that they would look outside
of the memorandum but it would be poor practice to rely on this. Fur-
ther, there might well be an argument that such a condition fails to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. From Gerruth we are unable to answer
that problem since the decision wasn't based on the Statute of Frauds
but rested on a purely contractual basis. From other Wisconsin cases
the answer to this latter problem still doesn't become clear. But the safe
procedure remains to be that of stating precisely and definitely the con-
ditions involved. Concededly, many times it will be hard to state in ad-
vance how much financing you will need, what the terms will be, etc.
The courts in this area are trying to evolve just rules. But until the
rules become more clear and definite, the only safe method is to place
all the conditions in the memorandum. The alternative is an unstated
condition precedent which will result in the contract hanging in the bal-
ance until litigation determines if the condition was performed. If it is a
3791 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser, §110 (Ann. Cum. Part. 1961); Kovarik v.
Vesely, supra note 31, pointed out where the seller offered to accept the
mortgage in advance the date specified for closing prevented the buyers from
rescinding when their attempt to secure financing failed.
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condition on a change in zoning or the sale of a house, be certain to
specify the time within which this must occur. If you fail to do this the
courts will interpret it as a reasonable time. A reasonable time has been
found by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to be as short as thirty days in
one case and as long as three and one-half years in another.38
Following the space provided for the contingent financing condi-
tions, the following printed clause appears:
Buyer agrees that, unless otherwise specified, he will pay all
costs of securing any financing to the extent permitted by law,
and to perform all acts necessary to expedite such financing.
The contingency clause would prevail if it provided for any limitation
on this printed clause.39 And it was suggested above that the amount of
loan procurement charges and prepayment penalties which the buyer is
willing to pay be inserted in the subject-to-financing details. Yet, should
there be no provisions as to what maximum origination costs the seller
would pay, he might be held to have breached the contract where fi-
nancing was available with, for example, a 5 % origination fee or where
he objected to a pre-payment penalty in the offered financing. 40 Can the
draftsman rely on a court not to so find? Why would any draftsman
wish to take the chance?
FIXTURES
Regarding fixtures the following clause appears:
Included in the purchase price are such of thte following items as
may be on the premises, which will be delivered free and clear
of encumbrance: all garden bulbs, plants, shrubs and trees; screen
doors and windows; electric lighting fixtures; window shades,
curtain rods and venetian blinds; bathroom assessory fixtures;
central heating units and attached equipment; water heaters;
linoleum cemented floors; carpeting in living room, dining room,
hallway and stairs; awnings; exterior attached antennas, (then
space for additions and exceptions)
Obviously, the above provision is an attempt to be as inclusive as
possible on a standard type form. The merit in this type of provision is
a spelling out of what is covered by the contract as completely as possi-
ble so as to avoid misunderstanding which might necessitate court in-
terpretation. Or what may be even worse, if the draftsman is a broker,
the souring of a deal might occur. By way of illustration it should be-
come more than clear that the list included in the form is not to-
38 Long Investment Co. v. O'Donnell, 3 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N.W. 2d 674 (1958).39 Hicks Printing Co. v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 138 Wis. 584; 120 N.W. 512
(1909). Tollefson v. Green Back Packers, Inc., 256 Wis. 318, 41 N.W. 201
(1950).
40 Fuy v. George Elkins Company, 162 Cal. App. 2d 256, 327 P. 2d 905 (1958)
held that a purchaser was not entitled to reject offered financing simply be-
cause he objected to a 2% pre-payment penalty clause where his contract was
conditioned "upon buyer obtaining a $20,000.00 loan at 5% for 20 years."
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tally exclusive and therefore cannot be blindly relied on as cover-
ing all the items intended to be conveyed. Consideration should be
given as to whether any of the following items should be included: fire
irons, fire screens, mirrors on walls, disposal units, built in bar and
stools, high fidelity or stereo equipment which is built in, kitchen ap-
pliances, space heaters, and air conditioners (especially the window
models). 41 Nor is the above list set out as the last word on adding to
the list provided for in the form. Rather, it is presented only to point
out the danger in failing to consider and to provide for all possible
questions which might be raised as obstacles to the successful completion
of the transaction. It should be remembered that once an attempt is
made to list specific items in a contract, if a court is called upon to con-
strue that contract, it is likely to decide that the intent of the parties was
to exclude any item not listed. If, following the above enumeration, the
draftsman were to include "and all other fixtures," the question might
be asked whether this general clause would prevent such a rule of con-
struction from operating. Here we bump into the rule of construction
known as Ejusdem Generis. 42 In an agreement containing general and
special provisions relating to the same thing, as a general rule, the
special provisions will control. The theory is that when parties have ex-
pressed themselves in reference to a particular matter, since their atten-
tion was obviously directed to such matter, it must be assumed that it
expressed their intent. Concurrent with this theory is the rationale that
reference to some general matter, within which the particular may be
included, does not necessarily indicate that the parties had the particular
matter in mind.4 3 When attempting to determine the value of such a
qualifying clause, it is apparent that the draftsman is attempting to draft
a document which will avoid discontent and most of all, litigation. If
he is a broker, he does not wish to see the sale lost because of misunder-
41 The REB manual contains a very extensive coverage of the fixture problem.
It should be referred to and understood by the non-lawyer draftsman. REB
MANUAL, WISCONSIN REAL ESTATE LAW, Ch. 5, (1962) ; A good discussion of
the law of fixtures is also to be found in BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, Ch.
XVI; (2d ed. 1955) ; also see Leisle v. Welfare Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 232
Wis. 440, 287 N.W. 739 (1939) and Thomsen v. Cullen, 196 Wis. 581, 219
N.W. 439 (1928).
42 In the construction of laws and other instruments the "ejusdem generis rule"
is that vhere general words follow enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as -applying only to
persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically
mentioned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th Edition (1951).
43 A case illustrating this rule is Scullin Steel Co. v. Mississippi Valley Iron Co.,
308 Mo. 453, 273 S.W. 95 (1925). There it was held that a smelting company
which had agreed to sell and deliver a certain amount of pig iron in install-
ments to a buyer under a contract providing that it would not be liable in
damages for failure to deliver because of strikes, accidents or other causes
beyond its control is not excused from making deliveries where cold weather
and unavailability of the proper kind of coke prevented delivery. The reason
given was the contract did not specifically mention this in the exemption
clause.
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standing over some item which may be worth only fifty dollars. If he is
a lawyer, he would hardly wish to see his poor draftsmanship lead to
more expensive litigation for his client. Therefore, it appears doubtful
that such a clause would be helpful to mitigate the effect of failing to
list some item which the purchaser and/or seller thought was to be in-
cluded. Further, since a contract will be strictly construed against the
party drafting it," the latter rule and that of Ejusdem Generis would
seem to provide only one other alternative. The draftsman could choose
not to mention items which might be classified as fixtures and to simply
rely upon the application of property law concepts of what are and are
not fixtures. This is an unsatisfactory approach on two counts. First, it
is not a realistic appraisal of the usual intent of the parties. The list on
the form includes items which might well be held not to be fixtures
but rather personal property; yet, the purchaser may well expect them
to be included. Secondly, this approach is one which anticipates litiga-
tion rather than one which tries to avoid it. It is an approach which is
likely to create an atmosphere of misunderstanding rather than under-
standing. If the draftsman is a broker confusion is even more likely to
occur, since a broker may not give advice as to the legal effect of such
an instrument.4 5 From the foregoing, it can be seen that what the form
attempts is a sensible approach to this problem. But the form is good
only as far as it goes. The items to be included or excluded will vary
with every transaction. Careful work and consideration will tend to
eliminate the problems that exist in the area. In this area the will of the
parties is more important than fine legal distinctions as to whether a
given item is a fixture. Whether it is a fixture or not becomes important
only if litigation arises.
TAXES
Regarding taxes the form provides:
General taxes levied in the year of closing shall be prorated at
the time of closing on the basis of general taxes for the preceding
year....
This is an innocent looking provision but may well be one which does
not literally mean what most people think it does. For the vast majority
of brokers in Wisconsin the clause means that taxes will be prorated as
of the day of closing on a daily basis."G If this be the correct literal
interpretation of this language and the sale is scheduled to be closed
on the 16th of the month, the seller would pay the taxes through the
44 Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger, 184 Wis. 139, 198 N.W. 394 (1924);
Hoffman v. Pfingsten, 260 Wis. 160, 50 N.W. 2d 369 (1951); Megal v. Kohl-
hardt, 11 Wis. 2d 70, 103 N.W. 2d 892 (1960).
45 Supra note 3 and see State ex rel Reynolds v. Dinger, supra note 2.
46 In fact the REB Manual flatly asserts that such is the case: "First, provides
for exact proration to the day, not to the nearest month." REB MANUAL,
WISCONsIN REAL ESTATE LAW, 5-17 (1962).
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15th. But the clause, as phrased, does not demand this. It says, "at the
time of closing" taxes shall be prorated. Literally, the contract requires
only that the parties shall prorate taxes and this should be done on the
day of closing. It does not command that such proration shall be com-
puted on a daily rather than a monthly basis. Nor is this objection mere
flyspecking. In a transaction involving highly taxed property the differ-
ence could be quite significant. And if before the time for closing the
purchaser should become discontented, it may be that he will raise just
such an objection at closing through his attorney and insist upon the
application of statutory law regarding such proration. Section 74.62 of
the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
As between grantor and grantee of any land, when there is no
express agreement as to which shall pay the taxes assessed there-
on for the year in which the conveyance is made, the grantor
shall be chargeable with and pay to the grantee an amount thereof
equal to one-twelfth of the taxes assessed in the current calendar
year multiplied by the number of months in the current calendar
year which have elapsed prior to the date of the conveyance, in-
cluding the month in which the conveyance is made if such con-
veyance occurs after the fifteenth day thereof. . ...1
With our hypothetical closing date of the 16th of the month, the seller
could be held accountable for the taxes covering the entire month. In
the case of highly taxed realty this could be a significant amount and
could result in a sale falling through where one or both of the parties
refuses to give in. Further support for the position that the present lan-
guage of the form does not provide for proration on a daily basis may
be drawn from the language used in the following clause providing that
proration of insurance, rents, and water shall be "prorated as of the
date of closing." If there is no difference of meaning, why was a differ-
ence in terminology adopted? Is it not conceivable that a court called
on to interpret such language would so reason? The alert draftsman
would do well to protect the parties involved by changing "at" to "as of",
thereby stating what is probably the intent of the parties in most cases
and bringing the contract into conformity with the general real estate
practice existing in Wisconsin. There is no reason why a draftsman
should stubbornly rely on the form as worded and risk possible loss of
the sale or costly litigation.
A final thought regarding the proration of taxes is that when it is
based on the preceding year it is often a poor compromise and should
be avoided wherever practical. Such an instance arises in those sales
which are scheduled to be closed toward the end of the year when the
taxes have been determined, or are determinable but not yet due. An-
other possibility would be to establish an escrow fund or reserve, out of
47 1Wis. STAT. §74.62 (1961).
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which the taxes would be paid when they are determined and become
due. Thus you would be achieving a proration of taxes after the fact,
which type of arrangement may well be the fairest to all concerned.
Such a provision will necessitate a change in the wording of the form
by the draftsman. Again we see the issue that must be faced in every
instance where a printed form is used. Does the particular clause in the
printed form suitably accomplish what the parties wish it to accomplish,
rather than making every situation fit the form.
INSURANCE, RENTS, AND UTILITIES
The clause providing for the proration of insurance, interest, rents
and water reads as follows:
Interest, prepaid insurance.., and rents and water shall be pro-
rated as of the date of closing. Accrued income and expenses,
including taxes for the day of closing, shall accrue to the seller.
As a practical matter, interest proration is appropriate only where a
mortgage is assumed. Insurance proration is probably the exception
rather than the rule. Yet the standard form contemplates that the buyer
will pay the seller the unearned premium for existing insurance on the
premises. The buyer should be made to realize that he thereby accepts
the seller's insurance company and agent or will suffer the short rate
loss attendant thereto. If the draftsman is a broker, may he advise as to
this legal effect without violating his limited privilege to draft such in-
struments ?
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Regarding special assessments the form provides a warning that if
assessments are contemplated, a special agreement should be made. The
pendency of such Kline Law assessments4 s should be specially checked
by the draftsman. It is probably all too often the tendency to simply
adopt the standard provisions of the contract before checking with the
city engineers' office to be certain that an area improvement program
is not already underway or about to begin. The standard provision of
the form provides:
Special assessments, if any for work on site actually commenced
prior to date of this offer, shall be paid by Seller.
Special assessments, if any, for work on site actually commenced
after the date of this offer, shall be paid by Buyer.
Problems in this area will arise where there is an area improvement
underway or contemplated and no special provision is made in the con-
48 Wis. STAT. §66.60 (1961) provides: (1) (a) As a complete alternative to all
other methods provided by law, any city or village may, by resolution of its
governing body, levy and collect special assessments upon property in a
limited and determinable area for special benefits conferred upon such
property by any municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or improvement out of
the proceeds of such special assessments.
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tract. Then, construing the contract, the parties will immediately ques-
tion what the words "for work on site" mean. Therefore, the draftsman
interested in avoiding litigation or discord among the parties, should,
as a matter of course, ascertain whether a special provision will be nec-
essary before obeying the commands of the form.
CONVEYANCE
The contract requires a conveyance in the following manner:
The Seller shall, upon payment of the purchase price, convey the
property by good and sufficient warranty deed, or other convey-
ance provided herein, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances,
excepting: Municipal and Zoning Ordinances and Recorded Ease-
ments for Public Utilities; Recorded Building Restrictions:
(blank space for other additions.)
In the form's margin the draftsman's attention is called to the following
three possible additions: Rights of tenant, existing mortgages, and
future special assessments. Quite obviously the warranty should spe-
cially except the rights of tenants. In addition it should specify whether
such rights are year to year, month to month, etc. Just as important to
the buyer is a provision specifying that there shall be no changes in the
terms of any such tenancy subsequent to the date of the offer.
What other exceptions should properly be excluded? Brokers and
their salesmen are told in the Real Estate Board Manual that the lan-
guage of the form excepting "... municipal and zoning ordinances and
recorded easements of public utilities, recorded building restriction ... "
adequately provides for the problems of whether zoning ordinances or
public restrictions, as represented by official maps, constitute encum-
brances on title.49 The conclusions of the manual's authors are that if
the zoning restricts the use, the buyer will be ". . . stuck, because in the
offer he agrees that the seller will deed to him free and clear except for
zoning ordinances." 50 Likewise, the question of whether the existence of
an official map would constitute an encumbrance on the land is claimed
to be provided for in the language "except for municipal ordinances."
As illustrative of the latter proposition, the publication cites by way of
example that "the buyer takes the loss when he discovers, after the offer
is signed and accepted, that because of the municipal ordinance he can't
build what he planned to on the land he contracted to buy."-" This is
probably good law when read in conjunction with the examples they
cite. But it is certainly questionable whether this clause accomplishes all
that the broker is led to believe. Does the provision cover the case
where there is an existing violation of either the zoning or land map
restrictions ?
4 Supra note 23, at 5-15.
so Ibid.
5" Ibid.
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Generally, zoning ordinances are not considered encumbrances with-
in the meaning of the terms'as used in a real estate contract52 although
the form seems to treat them as such by excluding them. But where
there is a present violation of such an ordinance at the time the contract
is entered into it may well be considered an encumbrance on the title
which would violate the covenant against encumbrances contained in
the warranty deed.53 Although it appears that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has never passed upon the question of whether a zoning violation
constitutes an encumbrance on title, it should be noted that in Miller v.
Milwaukee Odd Fellows Temple the suggestion was made that an exist-
ing violation would constitute an encumbrance.5 4 And in Brunke v.
Pharo,55 Justice Fairchild pointed out in the very first paragraph of the
decision, the veiled suggestion contained in the Miller case. It might
therefore be presumptuous to assume that an existing violation of a
zoning ordinance does not constitute an encumbrance by reason of the
printed clause in the form. It would appear that the draftsman should
again go beyond the printed form and spell out whether or not such
violations should be treated as encumbrances. If they are not to be so
considered, he should expressly except them. Further, what is meant
by the word "violations" itself should be indicated if discontent and
litigation are to be avoided. The same reasoning would apply to the
case of official maps where there is an existing violation as distinguished
from the restriction itself. How Wisconsin would rule on this question
is also unknown. But there are decisions in other jurisdictions holding
such official maps to be in themselves encumbrances on title. 6 Alert
draftsmen exercising a high degree of care would hesitate to take as
gospel the printed form in this instance.
Another facet of this problem is the status of existing building code
violations. Do they constitute an encumbrance creating a breach of war-
ranty? In Brunke v. Pharo,7 it was held that where official action had
been taken before the conveyance, so that enforcement action was immi-
nent when the deed was delivered, such building code violation con-
stituted an encumbrance and thus the warranty was breached. It should
52 Lasker v. Patrovsky, 264 Wis. 589, 60 N.W. 2d 336 (1952).
" Where a zoning ordinance required buildings to be set back at least twenty-
five feet from the street, but the house was set back only twenty-two feet, the
court said, "The title was not marketable not because of an existing ordinance
but because a building had been constructed upon the lot in violation of that
ordinance." Moyer v. DeVincentis Construction Company, 101 Pa. Super 588,
164 A. 111 (1933).
5 Miller v. Milwaukee Odd Fellows Temple, 206 Wis. 547, 240 N.W. 193 (1952).
There the court alluded to cases which had been cited to it and remarked that
the cases cited with one exception related to charges against the premises for
violation of ordinances which is an entirely different thing than a limitation
upon the use of the premises imposed by a valid zoning ordinance.
55 Brunke v. Pharo, 3 Wis. 2d 628, 89 N.W. 2d 221 (1958).56 Agliata v. D'Agostine, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 212 (1953).
57 Supra note 32.
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be noted that this case stands for a proposition which had not previously
been considered to be the law.58 In this case the court limited the appli-
cation of the rule to where some official action had been commenced
before delivery of the deed. But dare the draftsman trust that the court
will not go further next time? This is an especially important considera-
tion in light of the recent activities of our Supreme Court in overthrow-
ing other historical concepts of what the law was.
It is interesting to note that by way of summation to this entire area
of the warranty clause the R.E.B. Manual says:
All these rather frightening examples are not meant to suggest
any defect in the approved form. No reasonably simple form
could cover all the possible situations. That is why the form men-
tions only a few situations and leaves space for additional provi-
sions. To make the form work, the broker must inform himself
fully and then be sure he protects the seller while being fair and
honest with the buyer.59
I submit that the form is defective in the sense that it breeds false se-
curity. The draftsman who is not an attorney, but expected to perform
as if he were, would do well to heed the advice of the above quoted
passage. The anomoly here, however, is the inherent conflict of interest
problem faced by a broker attempting to live up to the command that
he protect the seller's interest while being fair and honest with the
buyer. Likewise, an attorney is faced with the same problem when a
seller and buyer walk into his office and ask him to draw up the neces-
sary papers. The attorney under the Canons of Professional Conduct
should advise one of the parties to secure another lawyer.60 The broker
is not subject to any such restriction.
Since the contract requires the delivery of title by warranty deed, it
will require certain special care on the part of the draftsman. Tech-
nically, the warranties which attach to the warranty deed are not a part
of the conveyance proper but constitute separate contracts and title
passes independently of them. By giving such warranties the vendor
contracts to stand liable and pay damages in the event of later title
failure in respect to any of the warranties. 61 In Wisconsin, a warranty
deed, by statute, has the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the
grantee with covenants of seisin, right to convey, quiet possession, and
freedom from all encumbrances. 82 In light of the effect of such cove-
nants when given, the draftsman must be certain to specify in the
58 See 21 C.J.S. Conveyancing §98 at 955 (1958); Berger v. Weinstein, 63 Pa.
Super 153 (1916).
59 Supra note 23, at 5-16.
co Canon 6 says: It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except
by express consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. .
AMERICAN BAR ASsN., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 6.6126 C.J.S. Deeds §22 at 628 and 629 (1958).
62 WIs. STAT. §235.06 (1961).
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interim contract any encumbrance which the buyer will be unable to re-
move before the time set for closing. The deed is expected to comply
with the contract of sale. But should the contract fail to specify any
exceptions to the agreement to deliver a warranty deed the purchaser
cannot be forced to accept a deed containing exceptions to the warranty.
Nor should the buyer accept such a deed in this case since if it is ac-
cepted as perrlormance of a contract to convey, the contract itself be-
comes merged into the deed.03 in such an instance, where the terms of
the deed vary from those contained in the contract, the deed will prevail
over the contract. Therefore, since the warranty deed purports to convey
"free and clear from all encumbrances whatever," the draftsman had
better except all present existing encumbrances if he is to protect the
vendor against a future suit for breach of contract. Easements not
obviously and notoriously affecting the physical condition of the land,
whether private or public, constitute such encumbrances.84 Outstanding
leases, reservations of right to enter the land,65 and unpaid taxes which
have been lawfully assessed have been held to be encumbrances and
should be specifically excepted.66 And as previously pointed out an exist-
ing building code violation may under certain circumstances constitute
an encumbrance.6 7 Any type of lien, such as a mortgage lien, tax lien,
judgment lien, or outstanding dower right should also be specifically
excepted.
EVIDENCE OF TITLE
Concerning evidence of title the form provides that the seller
may provide the buyer with either an abstract or a title insurance policy.
If he chooses to present an abstract the procedure is to deliver,
a complete abstract of title made by an abstract company, ex-
tended within twenty (20) days of the closing, said abstract to
show the Seller's title to be marketable and in the condition called
for by this agreement. The Buyer shall notify the Seller in writ-
ing of any valid objection to the title within ten (10) days after
the receipt of said abstract and the Seller shall then have a rea-
sonable time, but not exceeding sixty (60) days, within which to
rectify the title (or furnish a title policy as hereinafter provided)
and in such case the time of closing shall be accordingly ex-
tended.
Since in the expectations of both parties time is usually of prime con-
sideration, is the 60 day title correction extension of closing practical?
Considering the ever greater use and availability of title insurance,
should such a delay be written into the contract? These are questions
which go to the intent of the parties in any given transaction. But unless
63 See 84 A.L.R. 1008, 1034, 1041-1046 (1933).
64 Chandler v. Gault, 181 Wis. 5, 194 N.W. 33 (1923).
65 Gaslow v. Hunholtz, 160 Wis. 293, 151 N.VA. 810 (1915),
66 See 51 A.L.R. 1460 and 26 A.L.R. 873.
67 Supra note 53.
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the draftsman acquaints the parties with the alternatives they are not
likely to even realize the consequences until after the contract is signed
and accepted. Therefore, it is a good practice to fully acquaint the parties
with all the alternatives and let them decide rather than let the printed
form arbitrarily dictate the choice.
TIME BEING OF THE ESSENCE
The form provides as folows: "Time is of the essence hereto with
respect to occupancy." What then is the legal effect of this clause? Tradi-
tionally, before the merger of the law courts with equity, the answer
to this question differed depending on which court you were in. Law
courts were not liberal about substituting a reasonable time for the
time stated in the contract for closing. Equity on the other hand is prone
to view the day of performance stated in the contract as not being of
the essence and thereby avoid a forfeiture. But equity was opposed to a
forfeiture only if it would be both harsh and unjust. In determining
whether such a forfeiture might be unjust, the court of equity was likely
to consider the impact of its decision on both parties. If the purchaser
is tardy in payment the effect on the seller is not necessarily severe;
whereas, if the purchaser is deprived of a chance to pay later, he loses
his right to purchase and this might be too harsh. Likewise, if the ven-
dor does not have good title on the named date, the impact on the vendee
might be slight. But if the purchaser could then defeat the contract the
vendor might be harmed. Thus, time of the essence will be determined
by the overall effect of the delay on the party who was ready, willing,
and able to perform as compared to the amount the non-performing
party must forfeit were the contract to be strictly enforced.6 ,
In Edgerton v. Peckham9 it is suggested that any of three circum-
stances may make time of the essence. These circumstances are the rise
or depreciation of the value of the premises; the nature of the interest
in the property which is to be conveyed; and by express stipulation in
the contract itself. Further, this case held that even if it is not expressly
stated in the contract the party may make it so by a reasonable notice
to the other party.
In the classic case of King v. Connors0 plaintiff agreed to sell
property to the defendant "on or before May lst." The court stated that
in equity time is not of the essence of a contract unless so implied from
the surrounding circumstances or is expressed in the contract. In
Droppers v. Hand7' the court said the fact that the contract sets a time
for closing does not of itself make time of the essence. In Long Invest-
ment Co. v. O'Donnell72 our court carried this principle to the extreme
68 See 55 A f. JUR. §109-114 (1946).
69 Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 352 (1844).
70 King v. Connors, 222 Mass. 261, 110 N.E. 289 (1915).
71 Droppers v. Hand, 208 Wis. 681, 242 N.W. 483 (1932).
72 Long Investment Co. v. O'Donnell, 3 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N.VW. 2d 674 (1958).
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by saying that time was not of the essence and that a reasonable time
had not passed after the passage of three years although the land in
question had already been sold to another.
The immediate question relating to the provision in the standard
form is, will the expressing that time of occupancy is of the essence
make it so in the eyes of a court invoking equity principles? Further,
even if they do find that it was of the essence, will they impose a for-
feiture? The cases seem to be almost in complete agreement on the
proposition that even equity will recognize that time is of the essence
where it is expressly stated as such in the contract.7 3 The recent Wis-
consin case of Rottman v. Endejan7 4 alluded to the fact that time could
be made of the essence where the parties made it so by the terms of
their contract or their conduct.
Nevertheless, the draftsman should be aware that this clause still
may not have the effect that he might believe it has. Equity still abhors
a forfeiture and where the detriment to the nonbreaching party is not
very great, it is likely that equity will not impose such a forfeiture. The
court will probably agree that time is of the essence and therefore hold
that the contract was breached. But in the next breath they will prob-
ably refuse to enfore a forfeiture clause which appears in the contract.7 5
Therefore, merely inserting a "time of the essence" clause in the con-
tract will not guarantee, where physical occupancy is not given on the
appointed day, that the purchaser will be allowed to cancel the contract
forthwith. Likewise, any other stated time which might be made of
the essence by a specific provision in the contract will be subject to the
same scrutiny by a court applying equitable principles.
EARNEST MONEY
In applying earnest money funds to the purchase price the form
provides:
all money paid hereon shall be applied on the purchase price if
this offer is accepted on or before , 19-;
otherwise, to be returned to the undersigned Buyer no later than
and the offer shall be null and void.
But later in the form we find that:
All money paid under this contract shall be retained by
Broker, in his authorized trust account in
the Bank of , Wisconsin,
until the consumation or termination of this agreement; how
ever. ...
73 See Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Lowe, 150 Mich. 609, 114 N.W. 2d
393 (1962) ; Sims v. Nidiffer, 203 Va. 749, 127 S.E. 2d 85 (1962) ; Schoen v.
Grassman, 30 Misc. 2d 490, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1962).74 Rottman v. Endejan, 6 Wis. 2d 221, 94 N.W. 2d 596 (1959).
75 See Zempel v. Hughes, 235 Ill. 424, 85 N.E. 641 (1908).
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It would appear that the application of such funds to the purchase price
upon acceptance is inappropriate in light of the trust clause. Further,
such application would be especially inadvisable where the contract is
subject to a condition precedent, such as acquiring the designated fi-
nancing. In practice the broker generally retains the funds in his trust
account until the day of closing. Nevertheless, the two clauses as they
presently exist are contradictory in a sense. It would be entirely suffi-
cient to provide simply that the broker is to return the money if the
offer is not accepted by a certain date.
It should be remembered that earnest money is not essential to a
valid offer, and an offer made without any earnest money payment
would, if accepted by the seller, result in a valid contract. But when an
earnest money deposit is given as a down payment to the seller, the
purchaser has a vendee's lien for its amount providing the seller owns
the property.7 6
BUYER OR SELLER DEFAULTING
In the event that the buyer should default, the contract provides:
...all money paid hereunder shall at the option of the Seller,
be forfeited as liquidated damages and shall be paid to or retained
by the Seller, subject to deductions of Broker's commission and
disbursements, if any.
Such a forfeiture clause operates unless the deposit is returned promptly
upon the purchaser's breach. 77 This seriously limits the vendor's options
if there is any delay following the breach. The R.E.B. Manual suggests
that the broker should bring the matter of default immediately to the
attention of the seller and have him consult with an attorney.-, This is
excellent advice and should go a long way toward aiding in the protec-
tion of the seller's rights if adherred to. But the able draftsman, whether
he be an attorney or broker, might not consider it his duty to create
work for the legal profession. Here the draftsman should consider the
inclusion of a condition precedent to the activation of the provision for
liquidated damages. An example of this would be:
Should the undersigned buyer fail to carry out this agreement,
the seller may elect to declare a forfeiture and cancellation of this
contract and upon such election being made any payments there-
tofore made shall be retained by the seller as liquidated dam-
ages."9
76 Wenzel v. Roberts, 236 Wis. 315, 294 N.W. 871 (1940) ; Weidner v. Hyland,
216 Wis. 12, 256 N.W. 244 (1934). And see 92 C.J.S. 574, Vendor & Purchaser
(1955).7 Zimmerman v. Thompson, 16 Wis. 2d 74, 114 N.W. 2d 427 (1962).
78 Supra note 39, at 5-23.
79 In Reiter v. Barley, 180 Wash. 230, 39 Pac. 2d 370 the court said in inter-
preting such a clause: "If no determination of forfeiture is made, the right
and liabilities thereunder are not called into operation; in other words it is
not agreed that, in all events, the measure of damages for any breach of
the contract shall be payments theretofore made, but, that, if the vendors elect
to declare a forfeiture, this shall be the measure of damages."
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It was the fact that there was no condition precedent in the contract
that led our court in the Zimmernui case to the conclusion that mere
retention of the funds following a breach constituted an election which
effectively cut off any other contractual remedies. A second alternative
for the draftsman would be to follow the clue of the court in its decision
and drop the clause providing for liquidated damages. A reading of the
Zimmerman case indicates that a contract may provide that on the
buyer's default the plaintiff may keep the money paid and if it says
nothing about it being liquidated damages or in lieu of actual damages
such retention may not bar an action for actual damages. As the clause
presently stands the seller can recover no more than the amount paid
on the contract as of the time of the breach if he chooses to retain such
amounts.
Risx OF Loss
In the event of a casualty to the property in question the contract
provides:
In the event the premises shall be damaged by fire or elements
prior to the time of closing, in an amount of not more than ten
per cent of the selling price, the Seller shall be obligated to re-
pair the same. In the event such damage shall exceed such sum,
this contract may be cancelled at the option of the Buyer. Should
the Buyer elect to carry out this agreement despite such damage,
such Buyer shall be entitled to all the credit for the insurance
proceeds resulting from such damage, not exceeding, however,
the purchase price.
A fire may render the premises untenantable and still there may be less
than 10% damage. When must the seller repair? Must the buyer close
the sale before repairs are made? And if he must, is not the buyer
rather than the seller, being required to bear the risk of usable property
where the damage does not exceed 10%? Without any provision in the
contract the loss would fall on the seller unless the buyer has taken pos-
session or legal title has been transferred to the buyer by deed.80 Yet,
because of the indefiniteness of the clause in the standard printed con-
tract where the damage is material but not more than 10%, the risk of
loss may well be shifted to the buyer. In such a case, from the buyer's
viewpoint he would be better protected without such a clause in the
contract. If the draftsman is a broker, he finds himself in the position
of owing a primary duty to the seller and still being expected to render
the same service to the buyer that an attorney would. This is but another
instance where the broker may be forced to wrestle with a serious con-
flict of interest problem. It would appear that the fairest course of
action regarding both the seller and buyer would be to word the risk of
loss clause so as to provide that where the damages are less than 10%
80 Wis. STAT. §235.72 (1961).
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the seller shall be obligated to repair before the sale is to be closed.
Further provision should be made that any delay in closing, necessi-
tated by such need for repair, shall not exceed a specified period of
time unless the buyer so approves.
CONCLUSION
Printed forms that may be purchased at the supply store are
veritable traps. They have the wrong things in and the right
things out .... I"
The draftsman who allows himself to become a slave to such printed
forms may reasonably expect that he is rendering inferior service to his
clients and the public. If that draftsman is a non-lawyer who has a
limited privilege to practice law, he had best not allow the form to be
his master if he wishes to protect this very limited right. The introduc-
tion of labor saving forms has been a prolific source of error in the
drafting of conveyances and the like but it need not be so. The con-
scientious draftsman will not allow it to become a fact.
DONALD E. MAYEW
81 Woodruff, Lessor and Lessee, Parties to a Contract, 8 KAN. CITY L. R. 35,
45-46 (1939).
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